Employer Must Pay for Commute Time

Joseluis Alcantar sued his employer, Hobart Service, alleging Hobart did not compensate its technicians for the time they spent commuting in Hobart’s service vehicles from their homes to their job sites and from those job sites back home.  The general rule is that employers are not required to compensate employees for their commute to and from work.  So why did Joseluis think his employer must pay for commute time to and from work?  Because Hobart’s policies placed Joseluis under Hobart’s control while commuting.

Employer Must Pay for Commute Time

Employers must compensate an employee for all “hours worked,” which includes any time the employee is under the employer’s control.  Although Hobart did not require employees to bring company vehicles home, Joseluis alleged Hobart did not provide sufficient protected parking at the home office.  Since Joseluis was responsible for the safety of the vehicle and the expensive equipment in the vehicle, and because Hobart’s home office did not have sufficient space for all company vehicles, Joseluis felt he had to take the company vehicle home in order to keep it safe.

Hobart’s policies, among other things, severely restricted Joseluis’ off-work use of the company vehicle:

Personal use of the service vehicle, other than commuting from home to the first work assignment and from the last work assignment to home, is strictly prohibited unless prior written approval is granted by management. (An example of personal use for which prior approval could be granted would be in case of a dental appointment which cannot be scheduled after hours or on a weekend.)

Hobart also prohibited employees from carrying passengers without prior approval, and from transporting alcohol.  Hobart also required Joseluis to respond to telephone calls on his company-issued cell phone while commuting.

According to the court:

An employee’s commute is not typically compensable under California labor law, even “when the employee commutes in a vehicle that is owned, leased, or subsidized by the employer.” Cal. Lab. Code § 510(b). The time may be compensable, however, if the employee can classify it as “hours worked.” The Industrial Welfare Commission has defined “hours worked” as “the time during which an employee is subject to the control of an employer,” including “all the time the employee is suffered or permitted to work, whether or not required to do so.” See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11040(2)(K).

Joseluis argued that, as a practical matter, he was required to commute in the company vehicle, and since the employer controlled what he could and could not do during that commute, the employer must pay for commute time.  The court concluded that a reasonable jury could conclude that Joseluis’ commute time was compensable.

Employers who allow employees to use company vehicles to commute to and from work should carefully review their policies and procedures.  Too many restrictions on employee use of the company-vehicles could lead a court to conclude the employer must pay for commute time.

 

Original article by Robert E. Nuddleman of Nuddleman Law Firm, P.C.

Feel free to suggest topics for the blog. We are happy to consider topics pertaining to general points of Labor and Employment Law, but we cannot answer questions about specific situations or provide legal advice. If you desire legal advice, you should contact an attorney.

Your use of this blog does not create an attorney-client relationship between you and Nuddleman Law Firm, P.C. The use of the Internet or this blog for communication with the firm or any individual member of the firm does not establish an attorney-client relationship. Confidential or time-sensitive information should not be posted in this blog and Nuddleman Law Firm, P.C. cannot guarantee the confidentiality of anything posted to this blog.

The Nuddleman Law Firm, P.C. represents employees and businesses throughout Silicon Valley and the greater San Francisco Bay Area including Pleasanton, Oakland, San Ramon, Hayward, Palo Alto, Menlo Park, Mountain View, Los Altos, San Jose, the South Bay Area, Campbell, Los Gatos, Cupertino, Morgan Hill, Gilroy, Sunnyvale, Santa Cruz, Saratoga, and Alameda, San Mateo, Santa Clara, San Benito, Mendocino, and Calaveras counties.

NLRB Expands Joint-Employer Status

Employers using third-party employers or placement agencies have a new case to worry about.  In a recent NLRB decision, the board expanded the test for joint-employer status, making it easier for employees and unions to allege multiple entities are actually joint employers under the National Labor Relations Act.

In Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc., (Case 32–RC–109684) the NLRB considered whether the Board should adhere to its current standard for assessing joint-employer status under the NLRA or whether that standard should be “revised to better effectuate the purposes of the Act, in the current economic landscape.” The issue in the case was whether BFI and Leadpoint were joint employers nunder the NLRA. The Regional Director issued a Decision and Direction of Election finding that Leadpoint was the sole employer. The Union filed a request for review and asked the Board to reconsider its standard for evaluating joint employer relationships.

The board held that while the current standard is ostensibly based on a Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision, (NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Industries of Pennsylvania, Inc., 691 F.2d 1117), recent board decisions have “since imposed additional requirements for finding joint-employer status, which have no clear basis in the Third Circuit’s decision, in the common law, or in the text or policies of the Act.”  According to the board:

these additional requirements—which serve to significantly and unjustifiably narrow the circumstances where a joint-employment relationship can be found—leave the Board’s joint-employment jurisprudence
increasingly out of step with changing economic circumstances, particularly the recent dramatic growth in contingent employment relationships.

Relationship Between BFI and Leadpoint

BFI owns and operates a recycling facility.  It employs about 60 people outside of the facility who move materials and prepare them to be sorted inside the facility.  Leadpoint provides BFI with employees who work inside the facility sorting the recycled material and cleaning the facility and the equipment.  BFI’s contract with Leadpoint specifies that Leadpoint is the sole employer.  The contract is terminable at-will upon 30 days notice.

The board examined several factors in its analysis, that it believed relevant to deciding whether BFI and Leadpoint were joint employers.

Management Structure

Each company employs their own supervisors and managers, with BFI managers supervising BFI employees, and Leadpoint managers supervising Leadpoint employees.  The companies have separate human resources departments, although only Leadpoint had an HR representative on site.

Hiring

Leadpoint was responsible for recruiting, interviewing, testing, selecting, and hiring personnel to perform work for BFI, but BFI retained the right to request that personnel supplied by Leadpoint “meet or exceed [BFI’s] own standard selection procedures and tests.”

Discipline and Termination

Although the Agreement provides that Leadpoint has sole responsibility to counsel, discipline, review, evaluate, and terminate personnel who are assigned to BFI, it also grants BFI the authority to “reject any Personnel, and . . . discontinue the use of any personnel for any or no reason.

Wages and Benefits

Although the Agreement provides that Leadpoint “solely determines the pay rates paid to its Personnel,” the Agreement includes a rate schedule that requires BFI to compensate Leadpoint for each worker’s wage plus a specified percentage mark-up.  Additionally, Leadpoint was not allowed, without BFI’s approval, to “pay a pay rate in excess of the pay rate for full-time employees of [BFI] who perform similar tasks.”

Scheduling and Hours

Although Leadpoint selects which employees will work each shift, Leadpoint cannot change the shifts set by BFI.  Leadpoint employees must obtain an authorized BFI representative’s signature on the employee time records.

Work Processes

When BFI’s managers identify job performance problems of Leadpoint employees, they communicate their concerns to a Leadpoint supervisor, who is expected to address those issues with the employees.

Training and Safety

Leadpoint provides orientation and job training to its employees, but BFI occasionally provides substantive training and counseling.

Other Terms

The Agreement also says Leadpoint employees are not to be assigned to work at a BFI facility for more than 6 months, but BFI never invoked that particular clause.

Following prior Board precedent, the Director determined BFI is not a joint-employer of the Leadpoint employees because it does not “share or codetermine [with Leadpoint] those matters governing the essential terms and conditions of employment” of the Leadpoint employees.

The Board analyzed the changes to the joint-employer analysis over the last 60+ years.  The Board believed that prior cases impermissibly narrowed the test for joint-employer status, and made it clear that “[i]n determining whether an employment relationship exists for purposes of the Act, the Board must follow the common-law agency test.”  As emphasized by the Supreme Court, a critical issue is “whether one statutory employer ‘possessed sufficient control over the work of the employees to qualify as a joint employer with’ another statutory employer.”

New Test for Joint-Employer Status

The board announced a new standard, that it believes is really a restatement of the original correct standard, for determining joint-employer status:

The Board may find that two or more entities are joint employers of a single work force if they are both employers within the meaning of the common law, and if they share or codetermine those matters governing the essential terms and conditions of employment. In evaluating the allocation and exercise of control in the workplace, we will consider the various ways in which joint employers may “share” control over terms and conditions of employment or “codetermine” them, as the Board and the courts have done in the past.

The new test eliminates the the previously-applied requirement of “actual and direct control over workers” to establish a joint-employment relationship. Browning-Ferris may appeal the decision to federal courts, so we don’t know if this decision will be the final word in this case.

Although this case arose from a union’s attempt to represent previously unrepresented employees, the decision is important for all employers.  State and federal agencies are cracking down on employee misclassifications.  California enacted legislation allowing workers to sue labor contractors and the end-clients without having to prove a joint-employer relationship.  Several class actions are pending throughout the nation alleging joint-employer relationships, even when the companies maintain entirely separate companies.  Employers have to be more cautious than ever when using third-party employers and placement agencies.

Original article by Robert E. Nuddleman of Nuddleman Law Firm, P.C.

Feel free to suggest topics for the blog. We are happy to consider topics pertaining to general points of Labor and Employment Law, but we cannot answer questions about specific situations or provide legal advice. If you desire legal advice, you should contact an attorney.

Your use of this blog does not create an attorney-client relationship between you and Nuddleman Law Firm, P.C. The use of the Internet or this blog for communication with the firm or any individual member of the firm does not establish an attorney-client relationship. Confidential or time-sensitive information should not be posted in this blog and Nuddleman Law Firm, P.C. cannot guarantee the confidentiality of anything posted to this blog.

The Nuddleman Law Firm, P.C. represents employees and businesses throughout Silicon Valley and the greater San Francisco Bay Area including Pleasanton, Oakland, San Ramon, Hayward, Palo Alto, Menlo Park, Mountain View, Los Altos, San Jose, the South Bay Area, Campbell, Los Gatos, Cupertino, Morgan Hill, Gilroy, Sunnyvale, Santa Cruz, Saratoga, and Alameda, San Mateo, Santa Clara, San Benito, Mendocino, and Calaveras counties.

When can an employer require an employee to pay for training?

Some employers require employees to have certain training before hiring the employee, advancing the employee to a higher position or even to maintain employment.  In some instances, the training is required by law (e.g., state-mandated continuing education).  In other instances, the training is required by the employer, but not required by any statute or regulation.

Can an employer require an employee to pay for training?

In a recent decision by the Fourth Appellate District, In Re Acknowledgment Cases, the court held that the City of Los Angeles could not require police officers to reimburse the employer for training unless the training was legally required.

The City, requires that all newly hired police officers attend and graduate from the Los Angeles Police Academy.  Tired of providing the training only to have the officers leave to work for another police department, the City enacted LA Administrative Code section 4.1700, which provides that any police officer hired by the LAPD that does not remain employed with the LAPD for 60 months and goes to work for another law enforcement agency is required to reimburse the City a prorated portion of the cost of training at the academy.  The training consisted of state-mandated training as well as unique training for the LAPD.

Each applicant signed an agreement stating that he or she would reimburse the city for the direct and indirect costs of training if he or she leaves the LAPD within five years after graduation and becomes employed by another law enforcement agency within one year after leaving the LAPD.

43 former officers of the LAPD sued the LAPD claiming the agreement violated Labor Code sections 2802 and 2804. Labor Code section 2802 requires employers to indemnify employees for all necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the employee in direct consequence of discharging his or her duties, or at the direction of the employer.  Labor Code section 2804 says that an employee’s rights under Labor Code section 2802 may not be waived.  The officers contended that since the city required the employees to take training above and beyond state-mandated training, the city was required to bear the expense of that training, and requiring the employees to reimburse the employer for the cost of the additional training violates the Labor Code.

The City argued that because the officers did not pay for the training themselves, the officers did not incur any out-of-pocket expense, and therefore Labor Code section 2802 did not apply.  The court pointed out that the City’s argument contradicted the fact that the City sued the officers to recover the training costs.

The City also argued that Labor Code section 2802 did not apply because state law required training under the Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) legislation.  The City ran into problems, however, because the LAPD required training above and beyond the state-mandated training.

In analyzing the issue, the court relied, in part, on a 1994 opinion letter from the Department of Labor Standards Enforcement, which says:

There is generally no requirement that an employer pay for training leading to licensure or the cost of licensure for an employee. While the license may be a requirement of the employment, it is not the type of cost encompassed by Labor Code [section] 2802. The most important aspect of licensure is that it is required by the state or locality as a result of public policy. It is the employee who must be licensed and unless there is a specific statute which requires the employer to assume part of the cost, the cost of licensing must be borne by the employee.

There may be situations, however, where licensure is not actually required by statute or ordinance but the employer requires either the training or the licensing (or both) simply as a requirement of employment. In that case, the provisions of Labor Code [section] 2802 would require the employer to reimburse the cost. (DLSE Op. Ltr. (Nov. 17, 1994) at p. 1, fn. omitted.)

The court also differentiated itself from a 2008 case, City of Oakland v. Hassey (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1477, because the employees in Hassey did not claim Labor Code 2802 as a defense—so the previous court never analyzed the issue—and the City of Oakland did not require its officers attend the additional training.

The court announced the following rule: where an individual must, as a matter of law, have a license to carry out the duties of his or her employment, the employee must bear the cost of obtaining the license. It is also consistent with this purpose to require an employer to bear the cost of training which is not required to obtain the license but is intended solely to enable the employee to discharge his or her duties.

To put it another way: If the law requires the training, an employer can require an employee to pay for training.  If the employer requires the training, the employer is responsible for the costs.

The court held that section 4.1700 and the agreements were void to the extent they required officers to reimburse training other than statutorily mandated basic “POST” training.  The court concluded that basic POST training is not employer-mandated training and is not an expense of discharging the duties of employment. Therefore, the individual officers could be forced to pay for the state-mandated POST training.  To the extent a City required training beyond the legally-required training, such “department required” training is for the benefit of the employer” and an employer cannot require an employee to bear that cost.

I have handled several cases against an employer that uses a very similar scheme in order to keep employees from leaving their employment within one year of being hired.  Although I made the Labor Code section 2802 argument, there were no reported cases directly on point, and the cases all resolved before trial.  With this new case, that particular employer’s policies are clearly void, and could subject the company to significant liability.  Employers should carefully review their expense reimbursement and training reimbursement policies to ensure they do not violate Labor Code section 2802 and 2804.

Original article by Robert E. Nuddleman of Nuddleman Law Firm, P.C.

Feel free to suggest topics for the blog. We are happy to consider topics pertaining to general points of Labor and Employment Law, but we cannot answer questions about specific situations or provide legal advice. If you desire legal advice, you should contact an attorney.

Your use of this blog does not create an attorney-client relationship between you and Nuddleman Law Firm, P.C. The use of the Internet or this blog for communication with the firm or any individual member of the firm does not establish an attorney-client relationship. Confidential or time-sensitive information should not be posted in this blog and Nuddleman Law Firm, P.C. cannot guarantee the confidentiality of anything posted to this blog.

The Nuddleman Law Firm, P.C. represents employees and businesses throughout Silicon Valley and the greater San Francisco Bay Area including Pleasanton, Oakland, San Ramon, Hayward, Palo Alto, Menlo Park, Mountain View, Los Altos, San Jose, the South Bay Area, Campbell, Los Gatos, Cupertino, Morgan Hill, Gilroy, Sunnyvale, Santa Cruz, Saratoga, and Alameda, San Mateo, Santa Clara, San Benito, Mendocino, and Calaveras counties.

 

 

Workplace Dispute Resolution

I recently interviewed Jerry Marrs of Marrs Mediation regarding the financial and productivity benefits of workplace dispute resolution.

Workplace Dispute Resolution

Jerry Marrs explains what workplace dispute resolution is and how it can help employers and employees.  Workplace disputes not only create disharmony, the can also lead to wrongful termination, harassment or other lawsuits.  Whether the dispute is between colleagues, subordinates and managers, or different teams, Jerry helps foster a culture of communication, and helps the parties work toward resolution.

Listen to the interview here, and look for Jerry’s article in the upcoming ACBA Labor & Employment Law section e-newsletter.

Feel free to suggest topics for the blog. We are happy to consider topics pertaining to general points of Labor and Employment Law, but we cannot answer questions about specific situations or provide legal advice. If you desire legal advice, you should contact an attorney.

Your use of this blog does not create an attorney-client relationship between you and Nuddleman Law Firm, P.C. The use of the Internet or this blog for communication with the firm or any individual member of the firm does not establish an attorney-client relationship. Confidential or time-sensitive information should not be posted in this blog and Nuddleman Law Firm, P.C. cannot guarantee the confidentiality of anything posted to this blog.

The Nuddleman Law Firm, P.C. represents employees and businesses throughout Silicon Valley and the greater San Francisco Bay Area including Pleasanton, Oakland, San Ramon, Hayward, Palo Alto, Menlo Park, Mountain View, Los Altos, San Jose, the South Bay Area, Campbell, Los Gatos, Cupertino, Morgan Hill, Gilroy, Sunnyvale, Santa Cruz, Saratoga, and Alameda, San Mateo, Santa Clara, San Benito, Mendocino, and Calaveras counties.

Attorney’s Letter Did Not Comply With PAGA Notice Requirements

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held, in Alcantar v. Hobart Service, that an attorney’s letter did not comply with PAGA notice requirements, and therefore dismissed plaintiff’s PAGA claims.  According to the court, “the letter in which plaintiff disclosed his allegations against the employer did not contain sufficient facts to comply with the statute’s notice requirements.”

PAGA allows an employee to bring an action against an employer to recover civil penalties for violations of the California Labor Code. Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(a). This powerful statute allows plaintiffs to bring claims on behalf of other aggrieved employees, without requiring the employee to follow typical class action protocols.

PAGA Requires Written Notice of Facts and Theories

Shortly after PAGA was passed, the legislature amended the statute to cure perceived abuses of the Act. Before filing a lawsuit, the employee must give “written notice by certified mail to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency and the employer of the specific provisions of [the California Labor Code] alleged to have been violated, including the facts and theories to support the alleged violation.” Cal. Lab. Code § 2699.3(a)(1). This provides the LWDA and the employer an opportunity to review the allegations and determine whether a violation has occurred and to assess the seriousness of the allegations.

Attorney’s Letter Did Not Comply With PAGA Notice Requirements

After Alcantar filed suit seeking compensation for his commute time and for missed meal and rest breaks, the employer argued that the attorney’s letter did not comply with PAGA notice requirements. The court agreed.

Alcantar’s letter contained a series of legal conclusions, but no facts or theories:

Our offices have been retained by Joseluis Alcantara [sic] (Plaintiff). Plaintiff is a former employee of ITW Food Equipment Group, LLC aka Hobart Service (Defendant). Plaintiff contends that Defendant (1) failed to pay wages for all time worked; (2) failed to pay overtime wages for overtime worked; (3) failed to include the extra compensation required by California Labor Code section 1194 in the regular rate of pay when computing overtime compensation, thereby failing to pay Plaintiff and those who earned additional compensation for all overtime wages due; (4) failed to provide accurate wage statements to employees as required by California Labor Code section 226; (5) failed to provide reimbursement for work related expenses as required by Labor Code § 2802; and, (6) failed to provide off-duty meal periods and to pay compensation for work without off-duty meal periods to its California employees in violation of California Labor Code sections 226.7 and 512, and applicable Industrial Welfare Commission orders. Said conduct, in addition to the forgoing, violated each Labor Code section as set forth in California Labor Code section 2699.5.

The court held “[t]he only facts or theories that could be read into this letter are those implied by the claimed violations of specific sections of the California Labor Code…” and determined “[t]his is insufficient.”

Plaintiff’s letter—a string of legal conclusions with no factual allegations or theories of liability to support them—is insufficient to allow the Labor and Workforce Development Agency to intelligently assess the seriousness of the alleged violations. Neither does it provide sufficient information to permit the employer to determine what policies or practices are being complained of so as to know whether to fold or fight.

The court specifically referenced an unpublished opinion, Archila v. KFC U.S. Properties, Inc., 420 F. App’x 667, 669 (9th Cir. 2011), in which the court affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a PAGA claim, observing that “none of the materials Archila submitted to KFC or the LWDA contain ‘facts and theories’ to support his allegations” and the demand letter “merely lists several California Labor Code provisions Archila alleges KFC violated and requests that KFC conduct an investigation.”

Because Archila was unpublished, it carried little if any weight, and employers could not cite to Archila.  Alcantar may have revived Achila.

Employees must provide sufficient facts and theories in their PAGA notices to allow the employer and the LWDA to assess the seriousness of the alleged violations and provide sufficient information to permit the employer to determine what policies or practices are being complained of. Employers should carefully review any PAGA notice to ensure it states the facts and theories upon which the claims are based. If the PAGA notice does not contain sufficient facts to comply with the PAGA notice requirements, the employer may be able to dismiss the PAGA claim.  Alcantar is not entirely binding, however, since it is a Ninth Circuit decision interpreting California law.  We’ll have to wait and see if any California courts follow Alcantar’s reasoning.

Original article by Robert E. Nuddleman of Nuddleman Law Firm, P.C.

Feel free to suggest topics for the blog. We are happy to consider topics pertaining to general points of Labor and Employment Law, but we cannot answer questions about specific situations or provide legal advice. If you desire legal advice, you should contact an attorney.

Your use of this blog does not create an attorney-client relationship between you and Nuddleman Law Firm, P.C. The use of the Internet or this blog for communication with the firm or any individual member of the firm does not establish an attorney-client relationship. Confidential or time-sensitive information should not be posted in this blog and Nuddleman Law Firm, P.C. cannot guarantee the confidentiality of anything posted to this blog.

The Nuddleman Law Firm, P.C. represents employees and businesses throughout Silicon Valley and the greater San Francisco Bay Area including Pleasanton, Oakland, San Ramon, Hayward, Palo Alto, Menlo Park, Mountain View, Los Altos, San Jose, the South Bay Area, Campbell, Los Gatos, Cupertino, Morgan Hill, Gilroy, Sunnyvale, Santa Cruz, Saratoga, and Alameda, San Mateo, Santa Clara, San Benito, Mendocino, and Calaveras counties.

Wrongful Termination After Nurse Repeatedly Refused to Perform Nurse-Led Stress Tests

Nurse-Led Stress Tests

The Nursing Practice Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2700 et seq.) regulates the practice of nursing in California.  The Nursing Practice Act permits nurses to perform certain functions that would otherwise be considered the illegal practice of medicine, when such functions are performed pursuant to a hospital’s “standardized procedures.”  (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2725, subd. (c).)  The Nursing Practice Act Title 16 of the California Code of Regulations contains the guidelines promulgated implementing the NPA.  (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 16, § 1470-1474)

In Nosal-Tabor v. Sharp Chula Vista Medical Ctr.Karen, a registered nurse repeatedly refused to perform nurse-led stress tests and made numerous complaints concerning the testing to Sharp’s management.  The nurse complained that stress testing constitutes the practice of medicine and that Sharp had not adopted sufficient procedures to allow nurses to perform such tests.  Sharp’s management disagreed and told the nurse to conduct the stress testing.  After the nurse continued to refuse to perform nurse-led stress testing and to complain about its implementation, Sharp disciplined her and eventually terminated her employment.

Wrongful Termination

Nosal-Tabor sued Sharp, alleging wrongful termination and two causes of action premised on claims of improper workplace retaliation.  Sharp filed a motion for summary judgment.  The trial court granted the motion, ruling that Nosal-Tabor presented “no credible evidence that the Standardized Procedures in place at the time of her termination were insufficient.”

On appeal, Nosal-Tabor claimed that the trial court erred in granting Sharp’s motion for summary judgment.  Her primary contention is that the trial court erred in concluding that there was no evidence upon which a reasonable juror could find that Sharp had failed to adopt standardized procedures that comply with the guidelines.  Nosal-Tabor contended that this error caused the court to improperly conclude that she would be unable to establish any of her causes of action.

The appellate court determined that the documents that Sharp maintained for its standardized procedures did not contain several elements required by the regulations.  “In light of these deficiencies, a reasonable juror could find that Sharp improperly retaliated against, and wrongfully terminated, Nosal-Tabor when she complained about, and refused to perform, nurse-led stress testing pursuant to Sharp’s legally deficient procedures.”

Employers should be cautious when disciplining or terminating an employee for complaining about potential violations of the law.  Even when the company believes it has fully complied with the law, an employee may still be able to allege a claim for wrongful termination or retaliation.  If you have questions about your termination or if you are considering terminating an employee for potentially protected conduct, contact a knowledgeable wrongful termination lawyer.

Original article by Robert E. Nuddleman of Nuddleman Law Firm, P.C.

Feel free to suggest topics for the blog. We are happy to consider topics pertaining to general points of Labor and Employment Law, but we cannot answer questions about specific situations or provide legal advice. If you desire legal advice, you should contact an attorney.

Your use of this blog does not create an attorney-client relationship between you and Nuddleman Law Firm, P.C. The use of the Internet or this blog for communication with the firm or any individual member of the firm does not establish an attorney-client relationship. Confidential or time-sensitive information should not be posted in this blog and Nuddleman Law Firm, P.C. cannot guarantee the confidentiality of anything posted to this blog.

The Nuddleman Law Firm, P.C. represents employees and businesses throughout Silicon Valley and the greater San Francisco Bay Area including Pleasanton, Oakland, San Ramon, Hayward, Palo Alto, Menlo Park, Mountain View, Los Altos, San Jose, the South Bay Area, Campbell, Los Gatos, Cupertino, Morgan Hill, Gilroy, Sunnyvale, Santa Cruz, Saratoga, and Alameda, San Mateo, Santa Clara, San Benito, Mendocino, and Calaveras counties.